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Abstract. A proxy signature scheme allows an entity to delegate his/her
signing capability to another entity in such a way that the latter can sign
messages on behalf of the former. Such schemes have been suggested for
use in a number of applications, particularly in distributed computing
where delegation of rights is quite common. Followed by the ﬁrst schemes
introduced by Mambo, Usuda and Okamoto in 1996, a number of new
schemes and improvements have been proposed. In this paper, we present
a security analysis of four such schemes newly proposed in [14, 15]. By
successfully identifying several interesting forgery attacks, we show that
these four schemes all are insecure. Consequently, the fully distributed
proxy scheme in [11] is also insecure since it is based on the (insecure)
LKK scheme [13, 14]. In addition, we point out the reasons why the se-
curity proofs provided in [14] are invalid.
Keywords. Digital signatures, proxy signatures, security analysis.
1 Introduction
Background. A proxy signature scheme allows one user Alice, called original
signer, to delegate her signing capability to another user Bob, called proxy signer.
After that, the proxy signer Bob can sign messages on behalf of the original
signer Alice. Upon receiving a proxy signature on some message, a veriﬁer can
validate its correctness by the given veriﬁcation procedure, and then is convinced
of the original signer’s agreement on the signed message. In other words, proxy
signatures can be distinguished from standard signatures signed by either the
original signer or the proxy signer. Proxy signature schemes have been suggested
for use in a number of applications, particularly in distributed computing where
delegation of rights is quite common. Examples include e-cash systems [21],
mobile agents for electronic commerce [13, 14], mobile communications [22], grid
computing [8], global distribution networks [3], and distributed shared object
systems [17].
The basic idea of most existing proxy signature schemes is as follows. The
original signer Alice sends a speciﬁc message with its signature to the proxy
signer Bob, who then uses this information to construct a proxy private key.
With the proxy private key, Bob can generate proxy signatures by employing
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a speciﬁed standard signature scheme. When a proxy signature is given, a veriﬁer
ﬁrst computes the proxy public key from some public information, and then
checks its validity according to the corresponding standard signature veriﬁcation
procedure.
Classification. Mambo, Usuda, and Okamoto introduced the concept of proxy
signatures and proposed several constructions in [18, 19]. Based on the delegation
type, they classiﬁed proxy signatures as full delegation, partial delegation, and
delegation by warrant. In full delegation, Alice’s private key is given to Bob so
Bob has the same signing capability as Alice. For most of real-world settings,
such schemes are obviously impractical and insecure. In a partial delegation
scheme, a proxy signer has a new key, called proxy private key, which is diﬀerent
from Alice’s private key. So, proxy signatures generated by using proxy private
key are diﬀerent from Alice’s standard signatures. However, the proxy signer is
not limited on the range of messages he can sign. This weakness is eliminated in
delegation by warrant schemes by adding a warrant that speciﬁes what kinds of
messages are delegated, and may contain other information, such as the identities
of Alice and Bob, the delegation period, etc.
According to another criterion, i.e., whether the original signer knows the
proxy private key, proxy signatures can also be classiﬁed as proxy-unprotected
and proxy-protected schemes. This diﬀerentiation is important in practical appli-
cations, since it enables proxy signature schemes to avoid potential disputes be-
tween the original signer and proxy signer. That is, in a proxy-protected scheme
the original signer cannot ﬁrst generate a proxy signature, and later claims that
the signature is generated by the proxy signer, not by herself. Similarly, the orig-
inal signer also cannot be misattributed by the proxy signer. Since they clearly
distinguish the rights and responsibilities between the original signer and the
proxy signer, the proxy-protected partial delegation by warrant schemes have
attracted much more investigations than others. In fact, for simplicity, this spe-
cial kind of schemes is often called as proxy signature scheme.
Security Requirements. The security requirements for proxy signature are
ﬁrst speciﬁed in [18, 19], and later are kept almost the same beside being en-
hanced by [13, 14]. That is, a secure proxy signature scheme should satisfy the
following ﬁve requirements:
– R1) Verifiability: From the proxy signature, a veriﬁer can be convinced of
the original signer’s agreement on the signed message.
– R2) Strong unforgeability: Only the designated proxy signer can create a valid
proxy signature on behalf of the original signer. In other words, the original
signer and other third parties who are not designated as proxy signers cannot
create a valid proxy signature.
– R3) Strong identifiability: Anyone can determine the identity of the corre-
sponding proxy signer from a proxy signature.
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– R4) Strong undeniability: Once a proxy signer creates a valid proxy signature
on behalf of an original signer, he cannot repudiate the signature creation
against anyone else.
– R5) Prevention of misuse: The proxy signer cannot use the proxy key for
purposes other than generating a valid proxy signature. In case of misuse,
the responsibility of the proxy signer should be determined explicitly.
Related Work. Followed by the ﬁrst constructions given in [18, 19], a number
of new schemes and improvements have been proposed [12, 31, 32, 16, 9, 21, 22,
13, 14, 26, 15, 11, 30, 5]; however, most of them do not fully meet the above
listed security requirements. In [12], Kim, Park and Won introduced the concept
of partial delegation by warrant, and proposed a threshold proxy signature, in
which the original singer’s signing power is shared among a delegated group of n
proxy singers such that only t or more of them can generate proxy signatures
cooperatively. In [16], Lee et al. pointed out some weaknesses in Zhang’s thresh-
old proxy signatures [31, 32]. Later, some diﬀerent opinions on their attacks are
commented in [9]. In [13], Lee, Kim and Kim proposed non-designated proxy
signature in which a warrant does not designate the identity of a proxy signer so
any possible proxy signer can respond this delegation and become a proxy signer.
Furthermore, their scheme is used to design secure mobile agents in electronic
commerce setting [14]. One-time proxy signatures are studied in [2, 30].
In [15], Lee, Cheon, and Kim investigated whether a secure channel for de-
livery of a signed warrant is necessary in existing schemes. Their results show
that if the secure channel is not provided, the MUO scheme [18] and the LKK
scheme [13, 14] all are insecure. To remove the requirement of a secure channel
and overcome some other weaknesses, they revised the MUO and LKK schemes.
However, we will show that their revised schemes are still insecure. In addition,
the PH scheme [23], which uses a 3-pass blind signature protocol to deliver the
proxy private key, is also insecure [13, 15]. Boldyreva, Palacio, and Warinschi
presented the formal deﬁnition and security notion for proxy signature in [5],
i.e., the existential unforgeablity against adaptive chosen-message attacks [10].
At the same time, they proposed a provably secure scheme, called triple Schnorr
proxy signature scheme, which is modiﬁed from the KPW scheme [12].
In contrast to the above mentioned schemes, which all are based on discrete
logarithm cryptosystems, several RSA-based proxy signature schemes are pro-
posed in [21, 14, 26]. In particular, the OTO scheme [21] and the LKK RSA-based
scheme [14] are proved as secure as RSA signatures in the sense of polynomial-
time reducibility. However, the OTO scheme in fact has a weak security since it
is designed as a proxy-unprotected scheme; the security of Shao’s schemes [26]
is not proved. Moreover, the security proofs for the LKK schemes are incorrect
(we will show later).
Our Contribution. In this paper, we present a security analysis of four proxy
signature schemes newly proposed in [14, 15]. More speciﬁcally, we focus on the
revised MUO scheme proposed by [15], the LKK scheme [13, 14] and its revised
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version [15], and the LKK RSA-based proxy signature proposed in [14]. To show
the insecurity of these schemes, we successfully identify several forgery attacks
which have diﬀerent strengths and can be used in diﬀerent settings. Moreover,
we point out the reasons why the security proofs provided in [14] are invalid.
In addition, the fully distributed proxy signature scheme in [11] is consequently
broken, because it is based on the insecure LKK scheme.
Organization. In Section 2, the revised MUO scheme proposed by [15] is an-
alyzed. Then, we analyze the security of the LKK schemes [14] and the revised
LKK scheme [15] in Section 3. The security analysis of the LKK RSA-based
scheme [14] is given in Section 4. Finally, we conclude our paper in Section 5.
2 The MUO Scheme and Its Derivatives
Throughout this paper, p, q are two large primes such that q|(p−1) and Gq = 〈g〉
is a q-order multiplicative subgroup of Z∗p generated by an element g ∈ Z∗p.
The discrete logarithm problem in Gq is assumed to be diﬃcult. Hereafter, we
call three such integers (p, q, g) a DLP-triple. Let h(·) be a collision resistant
hash function. In addition, it is assumed that Alice is the original signer with
a certified key pair (xA, yA) where yA = gxA mod p, and Bob is a proxy signer
with a certiﬁed key pair (xB , yB) where yB = gxB mod p. Here, a certiﬁed key
pair (xA, yA) means that Alice knows the private key xA and has to prove her
knowledge of xA when she registers her public key certiﬁcate with a CA. In fact,
this is the recommended practice for certiﬁcation authorities [1, 20], and can
be used to prevent rogue-key attacks [5]. We denote by mw the warrant which
speciﬁes the delegation period, what kind of message m is delegated, and the
identity information of the original signer (and the proxy signer), etc.
2.1 The MUO Scheme and Its Security
Proxy Key Generation: Bob gets the proxy key pair (xP , yP ) as follows [18].
1) The original signer Alice generates a random number k ∈ Z∗q and computes
K = gk mod p. Then, she calculates sA = xA + k · K mod q, and sends
(sA,K) to Bob through a secure channel.
2) Bob checks whether gsA ≡ yA · KK mod p. If it is, Bob computes his proxy
private key xP as xP = sA + xB · yB mod q.
Proxy Signature Generation: When the proxy singer Bob signs a document m on
behalf of the original signer Alice, he executes one DLP-based ordinary signing
algorithm [6, 7, 27] with the proxy private key xP . The resulting proxy signature
σ is denoted by σ = (Sign(m,xP ),K, yA, yB).
Proxy Signature Verification: To verify the proxy signature σ, a veriﬁer ﬁrst com-
putes the proxy public key yP by
yP = yA · KK · yyBB mod p (= gxP mod p).
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The veriﬁcation is then carried out by the same checking operations as in the
corresponding standard DLP signature scheme.
In the above MUO scheme, requirement R5 is not satisﬁed since the warrant
(sA,K) includes neither the identity information of the proxy signer nor the
limit on delegated messages. Furthermore, the secure channel for delivery the
warrant is necessary. Otherwise, an interesting attack demonstrated in [15] can
be mounted if Schnorr signature scheme [27] is employed to generate proxy
signatures. This attack enables an attacker to convert a proxy signature σ into
a new one σ¯, where σ¯ is also a valid proxy signature but on behalf of a diﬀerent
original signer. We call this attack Original Signer Changing Attack.
2.2 Revised MUO Scheme and Its Security
To remove the secure channel while foiling the original signer changing attack,
Lee, Cheon, and Kim proposed the following revised MUO scheme [15]. However,
their revised scheme is still insecure, and in fact more vulnerable than the original
MUO scheme. Since proxy signature generation and veriﬁcation only involve
some standard operations, we focus on the proxy key generation protocol only.
Revised Proxy Key Generation: Bob gets a proxy key pair (xP , yP ) through the
following two steps.
1) An original signer Alice generates a random number k ∈ Z∗q and computes
K = gk mod p. After that, she calculates sA = xA + k · yB mod q, and
then sends (sA,K) to the proxy signer Bob (through a public, i.e., insecure,
channel).
2) Bob checks whether gsA ≡ yA · KyB mod p. If (sA,K) pass this validation,
Bob computes the proxy private key as xP = sA + xB · yA mod q.
The proxy public key yP , which is used in the proxy signature veriﬁcation
stage, is generated as follows:
yP = yA · KyB · yyAB mod p (= gxP mod p). (1)
Now we discuss the security of the revised MUO scheme. We present three
attacks to show that the revised MUO scheme does not satisfy R2, i.e., strong
unforgeablility (and then does not satisfy R4, i.e., strong undeniability). In the
ﬁrst attack, the original signer can forge a valid proxy signature under the name
of a proxy singer; our second attack allows an attacker to mount impersonating
attack, i.e., he can generate valid proxy signature on any message by directly
forging a valid proxy key pair; and in the third attack, a third party could
frame Alice and Bob that they generated a proxy signature on an arbitrary
message, but in fact they did not. In all three attacks, we assume that y−1B mod q
exists, i.e., gcd(yB , q) = 1. This assumption is reasonable since it holds for the
overwhelming many of DLP public keys.
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Forgery by the Original Signer. Suppose that the original signer Alice wants
to generate valid proxy signatures which look as if they are generated by a proxy
signer Bob. For this purpose, Alice does the following:
(1) Compute b = −yA · y−1B mod q that satisﬁes yA + b · yB = 0 mod q.
(2) Choose a random number c ∈ Z∗q , and deﬁne K¯ = ybB · gc mod p.
(3) The forged proxy key pair (x¯P , y¯P ) is given by:
x¯P = xA + c · yB mod q, and y¯P = gx¯P mod p. (2)
The forged (x¯P , y¯P ) with K¯ is a valid proxy key pair since it satisﬁes equation
(1), i.e.,
yA · K¯yB · yyAB mod p = yA · (ybB · gc)yB · yyAB mod p
= gxA+c·yB · yyA+b·yBB mod p
= gx¯P mod p
= y¯P .
Using the above forged proxy key pair (x¯P , y¯P ) with K¯, Alice can generate
valid proxy signature on any message m.
Impersonating Attack. In this scenario, we assume that Bob is not designated
as a proxy signer by the original signer Alice. However, our following attack
enables Bob to become a proxy signer of Alice by forging a valid proxy key pair
(x¯P , y¯P ), without Alice’s agreement and authorization. For this sake, he operates
as follows.
(1) Compute a = −y−1B mod q that satisﬁes a · yB + 1 = 0 mod q.
(2) Choose a random number c ∈ Z∗q , and deﬁne K¯ = yaA · gc mod p.
(3) The forged proxy key pair (x¯P , y¯P ) is given by
x¯P = c · yB + xB · yA mod q, and y¯P = gx¯P mod p. (3)
Similarly, the validity of the forged proxy key pair (x¯P , y¯P ) with K¯ can
be veriﬁed, i.e., y¯P = gx¯P mod p = yA · K¯yB · yyAB mod p. Using this forged
but valid (x¯P , y¯P ) with K¯, Bob can generate valid proxy signatures for arbi-
trary messages of his choice. In addition, by deﬁning s¯A = c · yB mod q, we
have gs¯A = yA · K¯yB mod p. Therefore, diﬀerent from the previous attack, in
this attack Bob can provide (s¯A, K¯) as a proof to show that he “indeed” is
a proxy signer designated by the original signer Alice. It is easy to see that
the distributions of (s¯A, K¯, x¯P , y¯P ) and (sA,K, xP , yP ) are statistically indis-
tinguishable. Thus, a third party cannot tell whether (s¯A, K¯, x¯P , y¯P ) is a tuple
generated normally. This attack implies that in the revised MUO scheme, any
user, if he likes, “automatically” becomes a proxy singer of another user.
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Framing Attack. In this attack, a third party Charlie can forge a proxy private
key x¯P and then generate valid proxy signatures such that a veriﬁer believes that
these signatures were signed by the proxy signer Bob on behalf of the original
signer Alice. To accomplish the attack, Charlie does the followings.
(1) Compute a = −y−1B mod q, and b = −yA · y−1B mod q.
(2) Select a random number c ∈ Z∗q , and deﬁne K¯ = yaA · ybB · gc mod p.
(3) The forged proxy key pair (x¯P , y¯P ) is computed from
x¯P = c · yB mod q, and y¯P = gx¯P mod p. (4)
Again, it can be veriﬁed directly that the forged (x¯P , y¯P ) with K¯ is a valid
proxy key pair, i.e., equation (1) holds.
After getting the above forged but valid proxy key pair (x¯P , y¯P ), Char-
lie can select an arbitrary message m which is beneﬁcial to himself. Then,
by using the proxy private key x¯P and K¯, he generates a proxy signature
σ¯ = (Sign(m, x¯P ), K¯, yA, yB). Since (x¯P , y¯P ) and K¯ satisfy the proxy public
key veriﬁcation equation (1), this forged proxy signature will pass the standard
DLP-based signature veriﬁcation equation respect to the proxy public key y¯P .
When such a forged proxy signature is presented, Alice and Bob cannot deny
that σ¯ is Bob’s proxy signature on behalf of Alice. Therefore, the result is that
Alice and Bob will be framed. And the worst is that they cannot defend for
themselves, because a judge cannot tell whether they are framed or they collude
together to cheat the veriﬁer.
In addition, we would like to point out that the revised MUO scheme has
other two weaknesses. The ﬁrst one is that if Bob got a warrant (sA,K) from
Alice, he can create a new one (s¯A, K¯) for himself by selecting a random number
k¯ ∈R Z∗q , and deﬁning K¯ = K · gk¯ mod p and s¯A = sA + k¯ · yB mod q. In
addition, from Bob’s warrant (sA,K) (remember in essence (sA,K) is public
information), Charlie can derive a new warrant (s¯,K¯) for himself if q does not
divide his public key yC . That is, he ﬁrst computes l = yB · y−1C mod q, and
selects a random number k¯ ∈ Z∗q . Then, Charlie deﬁnes s¯A = sA+k¯·yC mod q (=
xA + (kl + k¯) · yC mod q), and K¯ = K l · gk¯ mod p. Since gs¯A = yA · K¯yC mod p,
Charlie gets his proxy private key x¯P by x¯P = s¯A + xC · yA mod q.
3 The LKK Scheme and Its Derivatives
3.1 The LKK Scheme and Its Security
Proxy Key Generation: The original signer Alice uses the Schonrr scheme [27]
to sign a warrant mw, which speciﬁes which messages Bob can sign on behalf
of Alice, the validity period of delegation, etc. That is, Alice chooses a random
number kA ∈ Z∗q , computes rA = gkA mod p and sA = kA+xA·h(mw, rA) mod q.
Then, the tuple (mw, rA, sA) is sent to the proxy signer Bob, and Bob checks its
validity by
gsA ≡ yh(mw,rA)A · rA mod p.
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If this veriﬁcation is correct, Bob sets his proxy key pair (xP , yP ) as
xP = sA + xB mod q, yP = gxP mod p (= y
h(mw,rA)
A · rA · yB mod p).
Proxy Signature Generation: With the proxy key pair (xP , yP ), Bob can use
any DLP-based signature scheme to generate proxy signature on any delegated
message m. The resulting proxy signature is a tuple σ = (sign(m,xP ),mw,
rA, yA, yB).
Proxy Signature Verification: To check the validity of σ, a veriﬁer ﬁrst checks
whether message m conforms to the warrant mw. If this check is positive, he
computes the proxy public key yP as follows:
yP = y
h(mw,rA)
A · rA · yB mod p (= gxP mod p). (5)
Finally, the veriﬁer checks whether sign(m,xP ) is a valid signature on mes-
sage m with respect to the proxy public key yP in the corresponding DLP-based
signature scheme.
The authors of [14] proved that the (Schonrr-based) LKK scheme is as secure
as the Schnorr scheme. Then, based on the result of [24] which shows that under
DLP assumption the Schnorr scheme is secure in the random oracle model [4],
they concluded that the LKK satisﬁes all the requirements from R1 to R5.
However, the proofs provided in [14] is not rigorous. For example, when they
discuss the forgery by Alice in Theorem 1 (page 480 of [14]), the ability of
Alice is limited to forge a Schnorr signature pair (r, s) for a new message m
such that gs = (yh(mw,rA)A · rA · yB)h(m,r) · r mod p, where Alice knows two
exponents kA and k such that rA = gkA mod p and r = gk mod p. However,
according to the veriﬁcation procedure described in their scheme, a successful
forgery by Alice only means that she can generate a Schnorr signature pair (r, s)
for a new message m that satisﬁes gs = (yh(m¯w,r¯A)A · r¯A · yB)h(m,r) · r mod p,
where the warrant m¯w may be diﬀerent from mw though m conforms to m¯w,
and r¯A and r are two public values but Alice maybe does not know their discrete
logarithms to the base g (In the extreme situation, r¯A, r /∈ Gq). In fact, the
original signer Alice can mount the following concrete attack.
(1) Create a warrant m¯w, select a random number c ∈ Z∗q , and then deﬁne
r¯A = y−1B · gc mod p.
(2) The forged proxy key pair (x¯P , y¯P ) is given by:
x¯P = c + xA · h(m¯w, r¯A) mod q, y¯P = gx¯P mod p.
One can directly verify that (x¯P , y¯P ) is a valid proxy key pair with respect
to (m¯w, r¯A), since y¯P = gx¯P mod p = y
h(m¯w,r¯A)
A · r¯A · yB mod p.
After getting x¯P , for any message m which conforms to m¯w, Alice can gener-
ate a valid proxy signature σ for m in which Bob will be identiﬁed as the proxy
signer. Bob is thus framed that he signed some message on behalf of Alice. When
such a forged proxy signature is presented, a veriﬁer cannot recognize that in
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fact it was not generated by Bob. In the above attack, Alice cannot provide s¯A
satisfying gs¯A = yh(m¯w,r¯A)A · r¯A mod p. So, this attack is more powerful if the
original signer is not supposed to present sA when a dispute between Alice and
Bob happens. For example, in electronic commerce setting where mobile agents
are used to transfer signed warrants [14], all or some sA’s may be deleted be-
fore potential disputes occur due to the storage consideration. Anyway, neither
the original LKK scheme nor the revised LKK scheme presented how to solve
disputes between the original signer and proxy signers. At the same time, the
authors also did not mention whether there is a need to keep sA and xP safely
after they have been used.
Lee et al. [15] found that in the Schnorr-based LKK scheme, the original
signer can change Bob’s standard Schnorr signatures into proxy signatures in
which Bob is designated as the proxy signer, and vice versa. We call this at-
tack Transferring Attack. Their attack is weaker than our above attack in two
respects. On the one hand, our attack allows the original signer to forge proxy
signature on any message as her will, but in the transferring attack she can-
not forge proxy signatures for all messages which the proxy signer never signs.
On the other hand, we note that the transferring attack can be eliminated by
a simple technique - padding. For example, we can modify the LKK scheme as
follows. When the proxy signer Bob wants to generate a proxy signature for
a message m, he signs on the padded message m||mw, instead of m. That is,
here, the warrant mw is viewed as a proxy signature identiﬁer. At the same
time, a proxy signer should not generate standard signatures on a message of
the form m||mw. With this modiﬁcation, it is now diﬃcult for the original signer
Alice to apply transferring attacks.
Furthermore, to remove the secure channel and avoid the transferring attack
of the original LKK scheme, Lee et al. proposed a revised LKK scheme [15]. In
the next subsection, however, we will show that their revised LKK scheme is still
insecure.
3.2 Revised LKK Scheme and Its Security
Lee et al.’s revised LKK scheme [15] is reviewed as follows.
Revised Proxy Key Generation: Bob gets a proxy key pair (xP , yP ) from the orig-
inal signer Alice as follows.
1) Alice chooses at random kA ∈ Z∗q , and computes rA = gkA mod p and sA =
kA + xA · h(mw, rA) mod q. Then, the tuple (mw, rA, sA) is sent to Bob
through a public channel.
2) Bob checks whether (rA, sA) is a valid Schnorr signature on the warrant mw.
If the answer is positive, Bob chooses a random number kP , computes rP =
gkP mod p, and then sets his proxy key pair (xP , yP ) as
xP = sA + rP · xB mod q, and yP = gxP mod p.
Proxy Signature Generation and Verification: Using the proxy private key xP and
public parameters (mw, rA, rP ), the proxy singer Bob can generate a standard
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DLP-based signature for any message m which conforms to the warrant mw.
Let σ = (sing(m,xP ),mw, rA, rP ) 1 be Bob’s proxy signature on message m,
a veriﬁer checks the validity of σ with respect to the proxy public key yP , which
is computed by:
yP = y
h(mw,rA)
A · rA · yrPB mod p (= gxP mod p). (6)
Lee et al. claimed that the above revised LKK scheme not only removes the
requirement on the secure channel, but also overcomes the weaknesses in previous
schemes. They indeed provide a security analysis to show that the revised LKK
scheme is immune to the transferring attack. However, we ﬁnd their revised
version is still vulnerable to the forgery attack by the original signer and the
original signer changing attack.
Forgery by the Original Singer. To forge a proxy key pair, the original
signer Alice selects two random numbers k¯P , c ∈ Z∗q , sets r¯P = gk¯P mod p and
deﬁnes r¯A = y−r¯PB · gc mod p. Then, Alice computes the forged proxy key pair
(x¯P , y¯P ) as
x¯P = c + xA · h(m¯w, r¯A) mod q, y¯P = gx¯P mod p.
In the above equation, m¯w is a new warrant created by Alice. In addition, the
forged (x¯P , y¯P ) with (m¯w, r¯A, r¯P ) is a valid proxy key pair, since
y
h(m¯w,r¯A)
A · r¯A · yr¯PB = yh(m¯w,r¯A)A · y−r¯PB · gc · yr¯PB mod p
= yh(m¯w,r¯A)A · gc mod p
= gc+xA·h(m¯w,r¯A) mod p
= gx¯P mod p
= y¯P .
Using the forged key pair (x¯P , y¯P ), Alice can create valid proxy signatures
for arbitrary messages at her will.
Original Signer Changing Attack. Now, assume that Bob has a proxy key
pair (xP , yP ) for the original signer Alice. At the same time, Bob generated
a proxy signature σ = (r, s,mw, rA, rP ) for a message m using the Schnorr
signature scheme. That is, there exists a number k ∈ Z∗q such that
r = gk mod p, s = k + xP · h(m, r) mod q.
In the following, we show that a third party Charlie can transform σ into σ¯
such that σ¯ is a proxy signature generated by Bob on behalf of Charlie himself.
To this end, Charlie ﬁrst creates a new warrant m¯w such that the message m
conforms to m¯w. In addition, if necessary, Charlie speciﬁes in m¯w that himself
1 If yA and yB are not included in mw, it is necessary to list them in σ explicitly.
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is the original signer, and Bob is the proxy signer. After m¯w has been prepared,
Charlie chooses a random number kC ∈ Z∗q , and computes rC = gkC mod p
and sC = kC + xC · h(m¯w, rC) mod q. Finally, using the public information sA,
Charlie computes s¯ by:
s¯ = s − sA · h(m, r) + sC · h(m, r) mod q
The resulting proxy signature σ¯ for message m is set as σ¯ = (r, s¯, m¯w, rC , rP ).
To verify the validity of σ¯, a recipient ﬁrst generates the proxy public key y¯P
from
y¯P = y
h(m¯w,rC)
C · rC · yrPB mod p.
Let x¯P = rP · xB + sC mod q, then we have y¯P = gx¯P mod p. The following
equalities justify that σ¯ is a valid proxy signature generated by Bob on behalf
of Charlie, i.e., the tuple (r, s¯) is a valid Schnorr signature pair with respect to
the key pair (x¯P , y¯P ):
s¯ = s − sA · h(m, r) + sC · h(m, r) mod q
= k + xP · h(m, r)− sA · h(m, r) + sC · h(m, r) mod q
= k + (rP · xB + sA) · h(m, r)− sA · h(m, r) + sC · h(m, r) mod q
= k + (rP · xB + sC) · h(m, r) mod q
= k + x¯P · h(m, r) mod q.
Furthermore, it is not diﬃcult to see that when Bob has two signed warrants
(mw, rA, sA) and (m¯w, rC , sC) generated by Alice and Charlie respectively, any-
body can convert Bob’s proxy signature σ on a message m on behalf of the
original signer Alice into a new proxy signature σ¯ on the same message in which
Bob is the proxy signer but Charlie becomes the original signer. The only re-
quirement is that message m also conforms to the warrant m¯w. The reason is that
(rA, sA) and (rC , sC) are in fact public information, since they are transferred
through a public channel.
4 The LKK RSA-Based Scheme
In this section we analyze the security of the LKK RSA-based proxy scheme
proposed in [14]. First of all, we review it brieﬂy.
Let ((nA, eA), dA) and ((nB , eB), dB) be the certiﬁed ordinary RSA key pairs
of Alice and Bob, respectively. Denote the identities of Alice and Bob as IDA
and IDB. To designate Bob as her proxy signer, Alice creates a warrant mw and
signs it, i.e., she generates k = h(IDA,mw)dA mod nA. Then, (IDA,mw, k) is
sent to Bob.
Bob checks the validity of (IDA,mw, k) by h(IDA,mw) ≡ keA mod nA. To
generate a proxy signature on message m which conforms to mw, he computes
the triple (x, y, z) as follows:
x = h(IDA,mw, IDB,m)dB mod nB,
y = h(IDA,mw)x mod nA,
z = kx mod nA.
316 Guilin Wang et al.
The resulting proxy signature is σ = (IDA,mw, IDB,m, x, y, z).
A recipient accepts a proxy signature σ iﬀ all the following checks hold:
1) Verify whether m conforms to the warrant mw.
2) Verify Bob’s RSA signature: h(IDA,mw, IDB,m) ≡ xeB mod nB.
3) Verify the validity of y: y ≡ h(IDA,mw)x mod nA.
4) Verify Alice’s RSA signature: y ≡ zeA mod nA.
In [14], Lee et al. proved that the above RSA-base proxy signature is as secure
as the RSA signature scheme. Obviously, forgery by Alice is diﬃcult since she
has to forge Bob’s standard RSA signature x on message (IDA,mw, IDB,m).
However, whether Bob can mount some attack is another story. Similar to pre-
vious discussion presented in Section 3.1, one can ﬁnd that their proof is not
rigorous. And in fact, the reasoning about Bob’s attacking ability in the proof of
Theorem 2 (page 482 of [14]) is incorrect, since given the value of x Bob cannot
ﬁnd the value of 1/x mod φ(nA). In more detail, the authors ﬁrst concluded that
if Bob can generate a valid proxy signature σ without Alice’s delegation, then
the following equations hold:
z = ydA mod nA = h(IDA,mw)xdA mod nA.
Secondly, the authors claimed that the above equalities mean that Bob can
compute Alice’s RSA signature k on message (IDA,mw) from
k = z1/x mod nA (= h(IDA,mw)dA mod nA).
So the authors have assumed that Bob can get the value of 1/x mod φ(nA)
when the value of x is given. However, this is the RSA problem [25] so it is an
intractable problem for Bob! Therefore, Theorem 2 provided by [14] is invalid.
To show the insecurity of the RSA-based LKK scheme directly, we demon-
strate the following attack for Bob who is not designated as a proxy signer of
Alice.
(1) Try diﬀerent warrants to get an mw such that m conforms to mw, and
that eA|x. The latter condition means that x = h(IDA,mw, IDB,m)dB
mod nB = eA · b for an integer b.
(2) Compute y = h(IDA,mw)x mod nA and z = h(IDA,mw)b mod nA.
(3) Output the proxy signature σ = (IDA,mw, IDB,m, x, y, z).
It is not diﬃcult to check the correctness of the above attack, since we have
y ≡ h(IDA,mw)x mod nA = h(IDA,mw)eA·b mod nA = zeA mod nA. The
smaller eA is, the easier is to mount our attack. Suggested values for eA in
practice include 3, 17, and 216 + 1 = 65537 (X.509 recommends 65537, and
PKCS #1 recommends either 3 or 65537). If eA = 3, our attack succeeds for
one try of mw with probability about 1/3. Even for eA = 65537, one required
warrant can be found after about 65537 diﬀerent tries. This is not a hard task
for an attacker.
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The LKK RSA-based scheme has another weakness, that is, it is not very
eﬃcient. In both proxy signature generation and veriﬁcation, one entity has to
perform three RSA modular exponentiations. Using the generic construction
given in [5], one can derive a provable secure RSA-based proxy signature scheme
in which only two modular exponentiations are needed in both proxy signature
generation and veriﬁcation. The basic idea is very simple. That is, to delegate
her signing ability to Bob, Alice sends Bob a proxy certiﬁcate cert which is
her standard RSA-signature on the warrant mw. A proxy signature σ on a mes-
sage m consists of (m, s,mw, cert), where s is Bob’s standard RSA signature
on message m. A veriﬁer validates σ by performing the following three checks:
(a) Whether m conforms to the warrant mw; (b) Whether cert is Alice’s RSA
signature on the warrant mw; (c) And whether s is Bob’s RSA signature on the
message m. To provide provable security, mw and m may need to be padded in
some way. For more detail, please refer to [5].
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a security analysis of four proxy signature schemes
newly proposed in [14, 15]. Our results show that all these schemes are insecure,
i.e., forgeable. As a by-product, the fully distributed proxy signature scheme
in [11] is also broken, because it is based on the insecure LKK scheme [14]. In
addition, we pointed out that the security proofs provided in [14] are incorrect.
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